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Fertility and education in Poland during state socialism 
Zuzanna Brzozowska1 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Studies on fertility in Poland focus on the turbulent transition period and its 
consequences. However, during state socialism significant societal and demographic 
changes took place. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
This article studies the macro-level relationship between education and completed 
fertility of Polish women born between 1930 and 1959, and tries to assess how changes 
in women’s educational structure affected fertility. 
 
METHODS 
Using data from the large-scale Fertility Survey 2002 that accompanied the Polish 
population census, I first look into fertility trends by education and five-year cohorts. 
Then, by applying Cho’s and Retherford’s decomposition analysis and direct 
standardisation, I assess the role of women’s educational expansion in fertility changes. 
 
RESULTS  
Despite profound structural changes and the ruling egalitarian ideology, the educational 
gradient in completed fertility remained strongly negative in all analysed cohorts. The 
observed decline in completed fertility from 2.51 in the 1930–34 cohort to 2.22 in the 
1955–59 cohort can be explained by the expansion of female education. Had the 
educational structure not changed, the completed fertility of the youngest cohort would 
have been slightly higher than that of the oldest cohort. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Under state socialism in Poland, better-educated women had on average fewer children 
than the less educated. The expansion of female education played an important role in 
fertility decline.  
                                                          
1 Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria.  
  E-Mail: Zuzanna.Brzozowska@oeaw.ac.at. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies on fertility in Poland mostly focus on the transition and post-transition period 
(Kotowska et al. 2008; Okólski 2006, 2007), contrasting the dynamic reality of the 
market economy with the predictability and stability of state socialism. It was, however, 
the People’s Republic of Poland that experienced an educational revolution and shifted 
millions of people up to the basic vocational and secondary educational levels. It was 
also under state socialism that the average number of children a woman gave birth to 
(i.e., the completed fertility rate, CFR) declined substantially, from 2.8 to 2.2 in the 
1930 and 1960 cohorts, respectively (Council of Europe 2005). 
The likely strength of the relationship between education and fertility in 
communist Poland is difficult to assess, as there have been few studies on this topic. As, 
officially, the political system strove for equality in every aspect of life, one would 
expect small differences in fertility by the level of education.  In practice, however, 
daily life was marked by social inequalities, which together with a means-tested family 
policy would speak for considerable educational differences in fertility, on a par with 
those in the Czech Republic, Russia, or Slovakia (Potančoková et al. 2008; Sobotka et 
al. 2008; Zakharov 2008). 
This paper examines the relationship between education and cohort-completed 
fertility under state socialism in Poland. It describes fertility trends by education and 
quantifies the effect of female educational expansion on cohort fertility. In the last 
section it also discusses the meaning of education in Polish society during state 
socialism. 
 
 
2. Data and methods 
2.1 Data 
The data come from the Fertility Survey that accompanied the 2002 Polish population 
census. From a representative sample of 264,845 women born between 1896 and 1986 I 
chose 116,969 females born between 1930 and 1959 (i.e., aged 43 to 72 at the time of 
the interview). After deleting cases with missing information on the number of children 
and on education, the final sample analysed in this paper covers 116,116 women (see 
Table A1 in Appendix for the distribution by cohort and education). The observations 
were weighted with post-stratification weights calculated from the Population Census 
2002 by the Central Statistical Office.  
All the analyses were carried out using four educational categories, which 
correspond to the following levels of the International Standard Classification of 
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Education (ISCED)2: primary and lower (up to 7-8 years of schooling, ISCED 0, 1, and 
2); basic vocational (9‒11 years of schooling, ISCED 3C); secondary (11‒14 years of 
schooling, ISCED 3AB and 4); and tertiary (16 and more years of schooling, ISCED 5 
and 6). Basic vocational education leads to skilled-worker jobs such as hairdresser, 
cook, or car mechanic. The category “secondary education” includes comprehensive 
and vocational secondary school, lasting for 4 and 5 years, respectively, and 1 to 2 years 
of post-secondary non-tertiary education.3 Comprehensive secondary school was 
usually chosen by people who were either planning to attend university afterwards or to 
acquire non-tertiary education, e.g., qualifications for jobs like nurse, secretary, or 
technician. Vocational secondary school graduates either decided on tertiary education 
or directly entered the labour market, working as technicians or highly skilled workers. 
Due to its very small numbers, the post-tertiary education (ISCED 6) category was 
merged with the tertiary level (ISCED 5). A university diploma provided eligibility for 
professions such as teacher, physician, lawyer, or other specialist; technical occupations 
like engineer were relatively seldom chosen by women.  
The distribution by cohort and education of the cleaned and weighted sample is 
presented in the graph below (Figure 1).  
In the sample there are considerably fewer women born before and during the 
Second World War than afterwards (see Table A1 in Appendix), which raises doubts 
about the representativeness of the cohorts born before 1946. Including respondents at 
high ages in the analysis adds a potential source of bias, but there are good reasons for 
doing so, nonetheless. First, as seen in Figure 1, the cumulative distribution of 
educational attainment does not show any irregularities for cohorts born before 1946. 
There are some ups and downs among women with primary and basic vocational 
education born between 1932 and 1945, but the trend is very consistent: with time, the 
proportion of the least educated declines drastically, the proportion of women with 
basic vocational and secondary education increases sharply, and the proportion of those 
with tertiary education gradually goes up. Second, retrospective analyses conducted on 
women aged up to 70 and more are not uncommon in contemporary demography (cf. 
Neels and De Wachter 2010). Third, the completed fertility of female cohorts born 1930 
and after published by the Council of Europe (2005) differs little from the completed 
                                                          
2 I use the 1997 ISCED version. For details, please visit http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/ 
international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx.  
3 Secondary education could be disaggregated into comprehensive and vocational secondary education (see 
Figure A1 in Appendix for the cumulative distribution). However, in terms of fertility these two groups 
hardly differed. That is why they are kept as one category. Secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education have been merged into one for two reasons. First, the number of women with the latter education 
level was too small to analyse separately. Second, the fertility behaviour of women with that education level 
very much resembled that of women with secondary education. 
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fertility calculated here: the difference amounts to 5% and 6% for the 1935 and 1940 
cohorts, respectively (for details see Table A2 in Appendix). 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution by cohort and education at the time of the 
interview (in per cent)  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Fertility Survey 2002 
 
For the sake of comparability over cohorts, I assumed that women’s reproductive 
careers end at age 43 (as the youngest analysed cohort was 43 years old at the time of 
the interview). This common practice of ignoring a very minor portion of fertility at 
very high childbearing ages (Cohen et al. 2011; Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008) allowed 
me to include as many as 30 cohorts in the analysis with a loss of not more than 0.5% 
of the cohort completed fertility (see Table A2 in the Appendix for a comparison of the 
truncated and completed fertility with the completed fertility given by the Council of 
Europe).  
 
 
2.2 Methods 
First, I analyse the completed fertility trends by education. Then I conduct a two-
component decomposition, drawing on Cho’s and Retherford’s work (Canudas Romo 
2003; Cho and Retherford 1973), which is a simple extension of the Kitagawa 
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decomposition called “components of a difference between two rates” (Kitagawa 1955). 
Applying her decomposition framework, the difference between the CFR of cohorts 
born in year t and year t+h can be split into a change (1a) in the educational structure 
(compositional component) and (1b) in the specific (standardised) completed fertility 
rates (direct component): 
 
∆𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡) = ∑ [𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡+ℎ)𝑖+𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡)𝑖
2𝑖
∗ (𝜔(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖 − 𝜔(𝑡)𝑖)]    (1a) +∑ [𝜔(𝑡+ℎ)𝑖+𝜔(𝑡)𝑖
2𝑖
∗ (𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖 − 𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡)𝑖)]   (1b) 
 
where: 𝜔(𝑡)𝑖 = 𝑛(𝑡)𝑖𝑛(𝑡)  and 𝜔(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖 = 𝑛(𝑡+ℎ)𝑖𝑛(𝑡+ℎ)  , and denote the proportion of educational 
group i in the cohorts t and t+h, respectively. 
In order to relate the fertility changes to period, I further decompose expression 
(1b) into the standardised age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs). For simplicity and 
clarity, let us call it the difference in the standardised fertility component (and denote it 
as ΔSFC). As the CFR is calculated as the sum of ASFRs, i.e., 
 
𝐶𝐹𝑅 = ∑ 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑗  ,     (2) 
 
the decomposition can be written as: 
 
∆𝑆𝐹𝐶(𝑡) = �[𝜔(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖 + 𝜔(𝑡)𝑖2 ∗
𝑖
�𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖𝑗 − 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅(𝑡)𝑖𝑗]
𝑗
= 
∑ ∑ [𝜔(𝑡+ℎ)𝑖+𝜔(𝑡)𝑖2𝑖 ∗𝑗  (𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖𝑗 − 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅(𝑡)𝑖𝑗)]    (3) 
 
Each j component of ΔSFC represents the change in fertility in one of five age 
groups (under 20, 20‒24, 25‒29, 30–34, and over 34, which means here 35–43 and is 
further denoted as “35 and more”). The final decomposition equation can be written as 
follows:  
𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡 + ℎ) − 𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡) = ∑ [𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡+ℎ)𝑖+𝐶𝐹𝑅(𝑡)𝑖
2𝑖
∗ (𝜔(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖 − 𝜔(𝑡)𝑖)]  
   +∑ ∑ 𝜔(𝑡+ℎ)𝑖+𝜔(𝑡)𝑖
2𝑖
∗𝑗  (𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅(𝑡 + ℎ)𝑖𝑗 − 𝐴𝑆𝐹𝑅(𝑡)𝑖𝑗)    (4) 
 
In order to assess the role of education and standardised fertility in the CFR 
decrease between the oldest and the youngest analysed cohorts, I apply formulas (1ab) 
and (3) to women born in years 1930–34 and 1955–59. Then, for the purpose of 
examining trends, I repeat the decomposition analyses for all neighbouring five-year 
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cohorts. Additionally, I employ direct standardisation to show how the CFR would have 
changed if the educational structure had remained stable. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Educational differences in completed fertility 
Despite the extensive changes in female educational structure, the educational 
differences in completed fertility remained sharp throughout the analysed cohorts: on 
the whole, the better educated a woman was the fewer children she had (Figure 2).  
The completed fertility of women born between 1930–34 and 1940–44 declined 
linearly from 2.51 to 2.22, and then it levelled off. Within the educational groups, 
however, it was on the increase for most of the cohorts. Comparing the oldest and the 
youngest cohorts, fertility went up among women with basic vocational education (from 
2.29 to 2.45), and with secondary (from 1.91 to 2.04) and tertiary (from 1.53 to 1.67) 
education, whereas the fertility of the least educated remained almost at the same level 
(2.84 and 2.82, respectively). Their fertility seems to have been most distinctive: on 
average, they had 0.45 and 1.2 children more than women with basic vocational and 
tertiary education, respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Completed fertility rate (CFR) at age 43, by cohort and education 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the Fertility Survey,2002 
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3.2 Decomposition of the fertility changes 
The decomposition results for the oldest and the youngest five-year cohorts suggest that 
the fertility decline of 0.29 children per woman can be explained by changes in 
educational structure and that fertility net of educational changes actually increased by 
almost 0.1 (see the upper panel of Table 1). It looks as if the compositional effect 
played a much more important role than the direct one. However, the decomposition of 
fertility changes in the subsequent five-year cohorts (Table 1) shows that this 
impression is misleading. The educational structure was changing in one direction (the 
least educated group was shrinking while all the others were growing), while fertility 
net of educational changes went down in the two older cohorts (1935–39 and 1940–44) 
and then increased in the three younger cohorts. Consequently, the CFR declined 
sharply between the 1930–34 and 1935–39 cohorts (-0.13) and between the 1935–39 
and 1940–44 cohorts (-0.16). In the case of cohorts born after 1944, the negative 
structural effect was counterbalanced by the positive direct effect. This made the CFR 
decline more modest: in the last cohort the CFR actually increased by 0.05 compared to 
the previous cohort (1950–54). 
 
Table 1: CFR and its change over five-year cohorts  
cohort CFR change in CFR Decomposition of the change in CFR: 
   direct effect compositional effect 
1955–59 to 
1930–34 
 -0.29 0.08 -0.37 
     
1930–34 2.51 - - - 
1935–39 2.38 -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 
1940–44 2.22 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 
1945–49 2.18 -0.05 0.07 -0.12 
1950–54 2.17 -0.01 0.06 -0.07 
1955–59 2.22 0.05 0.09 -0.04 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Fertility Survey 2002. 
Note: Computations based on equation (1ab). 
 
The very strong compositional effects in the 1935–39 and 1945–49 cohorts are due 
to a sharp drop in the proportion of least educated but most fertile women: -10 and -16 
percentage points between the 1930–34 and 1935–39 and between the 1940–44 and 
1945–49 cohorts, respectively (results not shown; compare Figure 1 for educational 
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structure of one-year cohorts). In the 1935–39 cohort the most substantial increases 
were found in the share of women with secondary and tertiary education, and in the 
1945–49 cohort it was the group with secondary and basic vocational education that 
grew most. 
The graph below (Figure 3) clearly shows the role that changes in female 
educational structure played in the fertility decline. It compares the observed CFR with 
a directly standardised one, i.e., the CFR that would have been observed if the 
educational structure had not changed. 
 
Figure 3: The real and standardised CFR at age 43 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Fertility Survey 2002. 
Note: Computations based on direct standardisation of the CFR (the educational structure of the 1930-34 cohort is the standard one). 
 
Not surprisingly, the gap between the real and the standardised CFR is getting 
wider with time. In the last five-year cohort it reaches 0.33 children per woman (2.22 
vs. 2.55). Thus, had the educational structure remained constant, the completed fertility 
of the youngest five-year cohort would have not declined. On the contrary, it would 
have been 0.04 higher than that of the oldest one. 
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Further decomposition of the direct effect (i.e., computing the standardised fertility 
component: see equation (3)) suggests that the cohort changes in fertility (net of 
educational changes) at the most fertile ages were time-clustered (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The calendar time of decreases and increases in the standardised 
ASFRs over five-year cohorts 
 
 
Note: Dark (red) and light (green) colours represent the decreases and increases, respectively. Only changes of  
(-)0.02 and above are coloured; the biggest changes, between (-)0.05 and (-)0.07, are shaded.  
 
Most of the decreases took place in the 1960s, whereas the increases occurred in 
two waves: in the 1950s and between the 1970s and the mid-1980s. The former 
increases referred to fertility of teenagers and women between 20 and 24 years old; the 
latter ones included fertility of teenagers (cohort 1955–59), women in their 20s (cohorts 
1945–49, 1950–54 and 1955–59) and 30s (cohort 1945–49).  
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This study shows that the decline in completed fertility of Polish women born between 
1930–34 and 1955–59 can be explained by profound changes in female education 
structure: had it remained stable, fertility would have actually increased. The 
educational differences in completed fertility in all analysed cohorts were large and 
persistent: the average difference in CFR of women with at most primary education and 
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those with tertiary education amounted to 1.16 (1.3 and 1.15 in the oldest and youngest 
cohorts, respectively).  
In view of the egalitarian ideology of state socialism, the stable negative 
educational gradient in completed fertility might seem surprising. It cannot be 
interpreted from the opportunity costs perspective, as job alternatives for women were 
limited, regardless of their education (Fidelis 2010 chap.6; Titkow 1993; Zembrzuska 
2000). Ideational changes associated with the second demographic transition cannot 
serve as an explanation either, since these could not have appeared within or co-existed 
with a socialist system. Below, I give possible explanations discussed in the literature. 
Their testing needs further research. 
Despite the leading role of the working class, officially declared by the state and 
guaranteed by the 1952 Constitution (National Constituent Assembly 1952), the 
concept of traditional social hierarchy remained deeply embedded in Polish society 
throughout the communist period. In a non-meritocratic country, in which blue-collar 
workers often earned more than white-collar workers (Rutkowski 1996), education 
rather than the financial status was of central importance as a determining factor of 
social status. Thus highly educated people, the so-called ‘intelligentsia’, drew a clear 
distinction between their social class and the others by leading a ‘bourgeois’ lifestyle. 
They engaged in reading, went on holiday abroad if possible, sent their children to 
private piano lessons, or enabled them to take private English or French classes 
(Domański 2004; Giza-Poleszczuk 2007; Szacka 2008 chap.14). Contrary to the official 
ideology and policy, they embodied Becker’s theory of raising children of high quality 
(Becker 1991). Considering their low earnings this led to a quantity–quality trade-off.  
The secondary-educated ranked one level behind in the social hierarchy, aiming to 
lead a similar lifestyle to the ‘intelligentsia’. In general, people of a less educated 
background who wanted to push their children up the social ladder, tried to adopt the 
ideals and manners of the better educated strata (Domański 2004). In times of great 
upward social mobility, this behaviour inevitably led to a decline in cohort fertility. On 
the other hand, the adaptation was usually incomplete. The expansion of basic 
vocational and secondary and, to a lesser extent, tertiary education might have been the 
reason why fertility increased in these educational groups. With time they became more 
and more heterogeneous, absorbing people from less educated social backgrounds and 
of originally different values and lifestyles (Domański 2007 chap.14.3, 2004). This 
might explain the slightly narrowing gap in completed fertility between women with at 
most primary and basic vocational education (differences of 0.55 and 0.37 in the oldest 
and youngest cohorts, respectively), and between women with secondary and tertiary 
education (differences of 0.38 and 0.29 in the 1930–34 and the 1950–54 cohorts, 
respectively). An opposite process took place in the least-educated group. It became 
more selective, which might explain the stability of its completed fertility. 
Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 12 
http://www.demographic-research.org 329 
The increase in completed fertility net of educational changes, observed between 
the oldest and the youngest cohort, was entirely due to the increasing fertility of women 
under 25 years old (see the last column in Table A3 in Appendix). This might be the 
result of a mortality selection effect, which to some extent certainly affected the oldest 
cohort. However, it might also be an indicator of changing fertility patterns: Holzer-
Żelażewska and Tymicki (2009) have shown that fertility among women under 25 was 
much lower in the first post-war cohort (1946) than in the 1960 cohort. This finding 
shows that the fertility postponement in the post-educational phase that took place in 
capitalist Europe (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2012) was not observed in communist 
Poland (nor most probably in other European countries behind the Iron Curtain). This is 
in line with the explanation of early parenthood in the socialist countries given by van 
de Kaa (1994), that setting up a family there was a way of gaining independence. 
Centrally planned economies suffered from a persistent housing shortage, and being 
single or living as a childless couple reduced the chances of moving out of the parental 
home to almost zero. 
Finally, the timing of the ASFR increases might be associated with the substantial 
changes in parental leave policy that were introduced in 1968, 1972, and 1981 (Frątczak 
et al. 2007; Kurzynowski 2000; Zembrzuska 2000; compare Spéder and Kamarás 2008 
for Hungary). 
In sum, the educational differences in completed fertility under state socialism in 
Poland were substantial and persistent: better educated women had on average fewer 
children than the less educated. The expansion of female education played an important 
role in fertility decline.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: The selected cohorts by education, unweighted sample 
cohort 
primary and 
lower 
lower 
secondary 
upper 
secondary tertiary 
education not 
known 
unknown number of 
children all 
1930 2116 131 380 79 7 18 2731 
1931 1969 141 436 92 5 25 2668 
1932 1968 194 500 96 7 27 2792 
1933 1824 169 559 119 3 29 2703 
1934 1860 191 579 144 2 20 2796 
1935 1837 200 665 157 1 28 2888 
1936 1801 241 714 191 2 31 2980 
1937 1719 254 717 190 6 27 2913 
1938 1751 245 703 191 3 24 2917 
1939 1769 250 678 194 4 29 2924 
1940 1700 225 717 223 2 14 2881 
1941 1519 236 667 238 2 20 2682 
1942 1557 275 635 222 1 15 2705 
1943 1386 351 606 220 4 22 2589 
1944 1347 349 784 218 2 23 2723 
1945 1255 392 836 215 2 17 2717 
1946 1517 709 1219 333 5 24 3807 
1947 1557 791 1405 361 7 29 4150 
1948 1589 953 1614 414 3 30 4603 
1949 1517 990 1687 403 2 34 4633 
1950 1438 1095 1851 474 4 25 4887 
1951 1427 1202 2008 483 6 27 5153 
1952 1416 1247 2088 466 4 32 5253 
1953 1341 1354 2197 552 5 17 5466 
1954 1340 1460 2219 586 7 38 5650 
1955 1350 1382 2345 589 5 23 5694 
1956 1220 1539 2519 599 6 22 5905 
1957 1021 1640 2601 628 6 19 5915 
1958 899 1583 2588 608 2 23 5703 
1959 822 1621 2449 623 5 21 5541 
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Figure A1: Cumulative distribution by cohort and education at the time of the 
interview (in per cent) 
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Table A2: Completed fertility calculated from (1) the Fertility Survey 2002 (1a) 
measured at age 43, (1b) with no age limits, and given by the (2) 
Council of Europe 
cohort (1a) CFR at 43 
(1b) CFR completed 
(no age restrictions) (2) CFR Council of Europe 
1930 2.55 2.56 2.78 
1931 2.52 2.53  
1932 2.55 2.56  
1933 2.41 2.42  
1934 2.53 2.55  
1935 2.48 2.49 2.60 
1936 2.44 2.45  
1937 2.33 2.34  
1938 2.34 2.35  
1939 2.29 2.30  
1940 2.28 2.29 2.41 
1941 2.21 2.21  
1942 2.23 2.24  
1943 2.26 2.26  
1944 2.14 2.15  
1945 2.26 2.26 2.27 
1946 2.14 2.15  
1947 2.16 2.17  
1948 2.19 2.19  
1949 2.17 2.17  
1950 2.14 2.15 2.19 
1951 2.17 2.17  
1952 2.15 2.16  
1953 2.19 2.20  
1954 2.19 2.20  
1955 2.23 2.23 2.17 
1956 2.23 2.23  
1957 2.18 2.19  
1958 2.21 2.21 2.21 
1959 2.25 2.25 2.20 
 
Note: 1ab were calculated using the whole sample (including cases with missing education). 
The Council of Europe estimated CFR at age 49. For cohorts younger than 49 at the time of measurement they imputed the fertility at 
the missing reproductive ages, using the fertility rates of the most recently observed cohorts (Council of Europe, 2005). 
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Table A3: The decomposed change in the standardised CFR into changes in the 
standardised ASFRs, over consecutive five-year cohorts 
age\cohort 1935-39 1940-44 1945-49 1950-54 1955-59  1955-59 compared to 1930-34 
15-19 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02  0.05 
20-24 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.07  0.09 
25-29 -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04  -0.02 
30-34 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.04  -0.02 
35-43 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 
 
 
 
